The article offers an analysis of the potential impact of the Community Work Programme (CWP) on
the primary social goals of PEPs, namely to reduce poverty and unemployment. 5 Thus, assessments of PEPs should primarily focus on their impact on poverty and unemployment, with other effects, for instance on crime, health or education, 6 regarded as possible secondary outcomes. Nevertheless, since
PEPs affect many thousands, or even millions, of participants, their 'secondary outcomes' may be of considerable significance. It is therefore worthwhile to deepen our understanding of how to assess these outcomes as well.
This article focuses on a specific South African PEP, the Community Work Programme (CWP). The possible impact of the CWP, on intimate partner violence, collective violence and crime more generally, has been raised by other authors. 7 The CWP is of particular interest in terms of its potential impact on crime prevention, partly because, unlike some other PEPs in South Africa, it involves people from poor communities working within their own communities. 
The Community Work Programme
PEPs were first established by the post-apartheid government in the late 1990s. However, the most significant PEP, the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP), was officially launched in May
2004
. 8 The CWP is an off-shoot of the EPWP and was established partly on the basis of an assessment of the impact of the first phase of the EPWP.
This assessment noted in particular that EPWP programmes were 'mainly designed to offer a shortterm episode of full-time work' that was 'expected to facilitate entry into the wider labour market' but that 'many participants exited back into poverty instead'.
9
The CWP was established in recognition of the fact that unemployment in South Africa is structural. Unlike the EPWP, the work opportunities in the CWP are not short-term. The idea that CWP participants may exit the CWP to take up work opportunities or establish their own businesses is regarded favourably, and the CWP does indeed enhance the ability of some participants to do this. 11 But it cannot be assumed that participants will be able to do this is, nor is it a primary objective of the programme.
Due to the fact that it provides long-term stable work opportunities, the support that is provided by the CWP differs from that provided by the EPWP.
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The CWP also has a number of other features that distinguish it from the EPWP, and from many other PEPs internationally.
13
The CWP was initiated as a pilot programme in 2007.
Since 2010 it has been located in the Department CWP'. 32 There is currently no data to determine which of these factors are most significant in accounting for the relatively short duration of participation by many young men in the programme. As compared to older women and men, young women are also apparently more likely to join the CWP on a relatively short-term basis, with 36% of female participants in the under-35 category having been in the CWP for less than a year.
Could the reason for the differences between levels of female and male participation in the CWP be that more women are unemployed? In the fourth quarter of 2014, 49.2% of men were classified as employed, as opposed to 36.9% of women (Table 2 ).
However, statistics on people looking for work, who are classified as unemployed, and 'discouraged job seekers' who have not recently taken active steps to look for work, 33 indicate little gender difference in the two categories.
As can be seen in Table 2 , the number of women in the combined 'unemployed' and 'discouraged' this 56% to 44% ratio, rather than the 75% women to 25% men ratio currently reflected in the CWP.
Gender and age-related factors impacting on participation in the CWP In the research at CWP sites, male reluctance to participate in the CWP was often viewed as reflecting a male view that they would be lowering themselves by participating in the CWP; a view referred to as 'pride'.
There are more women than men in this project because women are used to house work and cleaning and they love working. Men are very few in this project because of pride.
Men have pride even when they have nothing.
Men will be very shy to work the kind of work we do in the CWP like cleaning the streets and cleaning the schools. One body of work that may shed light on this phenomenon focuses on young men's apparent need to position themselves 'within gender and age hierarchies' in order to achieve recognition as men. 48 This dominant (or 'hegemonic') model of masculinity for working class black South Africans is 'underpinned by male economic provision'. 49 Though young men identify with this expression of masculinity, they are prevented from achieving this status due to the limited economic opportunities available to them, leaving them 'socially positioned as children'. As a reaction to this, and in order to be able to position themselves as men (in their own eyes and the eyes of others) they invest in a 'particular youth masculinity' in which their ability to secure respect is achieved 'through violence against partners, control of partners, seeking multiple sexual partners, and violence against other men'. 50 The corollary of this is that some of those men, younger and older, who do participate in the CWP may not identify so strongly with these ideas about masculinity, and have personal identities that are 'maintained independently of peer recognition or affirmation'. 51 Implications for the status of women and men in poor communities The impact of stable household income on childhood risk factors • Enabling mothers or parents to maintain a relatively high level of supervision over their children, since they live and work in the same community.
They might not be able to 'keep an eye' on their children while at work, but it means that the time they spend away from home is not extended by travelling. 'Poor parental supervision is usually the strongest and most replicable predictor of offending', 58 while parental support has been found to protect against such behaviour. Unemployment 'leads to a lack of structure in people's lives, and to isolation and exclusion from the wider community'. 62 Thus, whether from the wages earned, participation in work, or a combination of the two, it appears likely that participation in the CWP has economic as well as social and emotional benefits for many participants 63 and that these may translate into benefits for their dependants.
The argument that CWP wages, and other benefits of participating in the CWP, will contribute to a reduction in some of the childhood risk factors for crime and violence, therefore makes good sense.
However, this argument also needs to take account of the impact of CWP wages on gender power relations in poor households. However, another study suggests that when a woman's economic situation improves, it might lead to abuse and the dissolution of the relationship, which would then account for the fact that there is no increase in violence in the long term. 67 Nevertheless, some of the literature does indicate that when women work while their male partners are unemployed, the risk of violence to the female partner increases. 68 As has been argued above, the CWP reinforces female economic empowerment while unemployed men maintain their disempowered position, and are thus increasingly disadvantaged relative to women. This takes place within a culture in which many men are invested in a 'youth masculinity' that includes the use of violence against women as part of its repertoire for being recognised as men. 69 The nett effect may be to increase the risk of violence women face from unemployed male partners, and more generally, to leave intact a situation of male dysfunctionality.
Intimate partner violence
The potentially beneficial impact of CWP wages in providing more stable incomes for poor households therefore needs to be juxtaposed against the possibility that the CWP, as it is currently operating, may exacerbate the risk of domestic violence and conflict in the home. 70 Intimate partner violence (IPV)
does not only adversely affect its immediate victims.
Children who witness or are otherwise exposed to 
Involvement of young men in crime and violence
Research shows that greater employment does reduce levels of crime, particularly property crime.
But it is primarily by increasing the employment of young men, particularly those who are 'low skilled', that levels of property crime are reduced. 75 This might imply that the CWP's capacity to have an impact on crime is dependent on the participation of young men in the programme. However, it cannot be assumed that increasing the number of young men in the CWP, on its own, would have significant crime reduction benefits. This is because participation in crime is influenced not only by the levels of employment of 'low-skilled' young men, but also by the value of wages. 76 The wages paid in the CWP are relatively low. As a result, the employment of young men in the CWP may not stop those who are involved in crime from continuing their criminal activity.
It is believed that another benefit of employment is that it builds social bonds and can thereby strengthen informal social control that serves as a deterrent to participation in crime. 77 However, higher paying jobs not only reduce financial motives to commit (property)
crime, but may also be more likely to strengthen pro-social bonds. 78 The social bonds formed in employment are not inevitably pro-social in nature, and this may apply to a greater degree to low-wage, low-quality jobs. 79 In so far as the bonds formed at work are primarily with other low-skilled young men, these bonds may actually facilitate participation in violence and crime.
Thus, attracting more young men into the CWP, on its own, may not be sufficient to discourage participation in crime. It may also be necessary for 
